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Abstract -Tax policy is a product of politics, so a complete understanding of tax policy requires an explicit recognition of the political environment within which tax policy is made. The paper emphasizes the concept of political costs associated with the tax system and discusses several aspects of tax policy using a public choice approach. The paper argues that the political costs associated with taxation can be minimized by embedding the tax system within a relatively inflexible fiscal constitution. Despite the insights the public choice perspective offers, most analysis of tax policy does not take public choice considerations into account.
Despite the fact that the tax structure is a product of the political process, rarely does an economic analysis of tax policy take account of the political environment within which the tax structure is designed.
1 The political environment is important for several reasons. Most obviously, because the tax structure is a product of politics, one must understand the political process to completely understand the tax system. Furthermore, if the tax structure is designed appropriately, the collective choice process can provide a revealed preference mechanism that can help enhance the efficiency of government both on the tax side and the expenditure side of the ledger. Also, public choice analysis might lend some insight into what constitutes an equitable tax structure. The analysis that follows begins with the recognition that the political system uses resources to design tax systems, and these costs should be taken into account along with other welfare costs of the tax system. The advice of economists has had a substantial impact on the tax structure both in the United States and worldwide. However, tax policy is the product of political decision making, with economic analysis playing only a supporting role. A closer integration of public choice theory into the analysis of taxation can help increase our understanding of the tax system and can improve the quality of advice that economists offer with regard to tax policy. Of course, much analysis of tax systems can be undertaken without an explicit recognition of the political system. For example, one does not need to take politics into account in order to estimate how much of a tax is shifted from the group upon which the tax is initially levied. Furthermore, public choice analysis is relatively young and not well-integrated into public finance, so this essay will present some avenues that can be explored, but there is still a substantial amount of work that can be profitably undertaken to integrate public choice analysis more fully into the analysis of taxation. While public choice theory might offer much to help advance the theory of taxation, the main focus of this essay will be policy oriented and will begin by explicitly recognizing the political costs that are created when people try to influence tax law for their benefit.
POLITICAL COSTS AS A WELFARE COST OF TAXATION
At the simplest level of analysis, the welfare cost of taxation arises because a tax causes people to substitute away from whatever is being taxed, resulting in an excess burden. In addition, economists have long recognized that administrative costs (the costs that government incurs to collect taxes and enforce tax laws) and compliance costs (the costs taxpayers incur in the process of calculating and paying taxes) are often significant and, as Slemrod (1990) notes, should be included as part of the welfare cost of the tax system. The political costs of the tax system are also significant, but are less often recognized in economic analysis. These costs include the cost to the government of legislating tax policy and, more importantly, the rent seeking costs incurred by those who want to influence tax legislation.
Rent-seeking activity occurs because people want to influence tax policy for their benefit. Those who are being taxed continually lobby to have their taxes reduced or eliminated, and even if a group is not currently being taxed, it needs to keep an active lobbying presence to guard against taxes that might be placed on it in the future. Thus, the easier it is to modify the tax structure, the higher will be the political costs associated with taxation. When the tax structure can be easily modified, taxpayers will find it in their interests to incur political costs to try to minimize their tax burdens. Thus, Buchanan (1967) has argued the merits of a fiscal constitution, which creates a basic tax structure that can be changed only if there is substantial consensus, reducing the potential payoff from trying to lobby for tax changes that create benefits for special interests.
2 The idea that rentseeking activity can impose significant welfare costs on an economy is relatively recent, dating to the articles of Tullock (1967) and Krueger (1974) , and while simple observation reveals that the costs are substantial, there are no really good estimates of the political costs the economy incurs because of the tax system. Holcombe (1997) estimates the annual political costs of a selective excise tax to be in excess of ten percent of the annual revenues raised, but this is a rough estimate based on limited data. Political costs in this range would exceed administrative and compliance costs combined, so if this estimate is even close, political costs are very significant. 3 One can see that, when an excise tax is levied on a narrow base, those paying the tax have an incentive to lobby for its removal. However, the tax does not even have to be levied in order to generate political costs. If the tax is being considered, the potential taxpayers have an incentive to lobby against it, resulting in political costs even though there is no tax revenue generated. 4 A tax structure that is easily modified can bring with it substantial political costs, not only because people have an incentive to lobby for changes for their benefit, but also because they must be on their guard to protect themselves from changes that could harm them. These political costs have largely been ignored by economists who have analyzed the efficiency of the tax system.
WICKSELL, PUBLIC FINANCE, AND PUBLIC CHOICE
Wicksell (1896), whose insights laid a foundation for modern public choice theory, was trying to design a more equitable and efficient tax system, so in this sense, public choice can trace its origins back to the theory of taxation. Wicksell envisioned creating a tax system that assigned tax shares to correspond to each taxpayer's benefit from the public expenditure, anticipating Lindahl (1919) pricing. Wicksell's idea was to ensure that tax shares corresponded to Lindahl prices by requiring an approximate unanimous agreement among taxpayers before undertaking public expenditures. The benefit principle is clearly embodied in the work of Wicksell and Lindahl, but so is the public choice notion that political agreement can be used as an indicator of economic efficiency. In theory, one can find the optimal level of public expenditures by summing the demands of all consumers, but in practice, revealing people's preferences for public goods is more problematic.
The political process can help reveal preferences, but under majority rule, efficiency can be assured only when taxes are levied according to the benefit principle. Otherwise, people will be revealing their preferences for receiving benefits paid for by taxes levied on others or against paying taxes for benefits received by others.
5 Application of the benefit principle has the advantage that majority rule decision making tends to lead toward efficient outcomes. Another advantage of Lindahl pricing is that all individuals agree on the quantity of the public good to be produced, making political decisions less costly to produce. Thus, for example, it makes sense to use a gas tax to finance roads for public choice reasons, because this tax is likely to approximate the benefit principle, facilitating political agreement that will result in an optimal level of that good being produced. If another tax that does not closely correspond to the benefit principle is used, there will be a struggle between those who expect to be net beneficiaries because of their heavy use of the roads and those who expect to be net losers because they will pay the bulk of the taxes used to finance the roads. The outcome will depend upon which group has more political power. Not only will more in political costs be incurred, it will be less likely that the political decision-making process will lead toward an optimal provision of the good. Buchanan and Tullock (1962) , extending Wicksell's analysis, make the distinction between constitutional and postconstitutional rules. Constitutional rules are relatively difficult to modify, whereas postconstitutional rules can be modified more easily. In order to minimize political costs, a tax system should be designed so that the overall structure is relatively unchangeable as a part of the fiscal constitution, with some flexibility at the postconstitutional level to modify the tax system in ways that incur only small political costs. For example, the use of gasoline taxes to finance highway expenditures could be constitutionally mandated, whereas the tax rate could be adjusted postconstitutionally to reflect changes in the demand for highways. While this approximates the practice of most U.S. states, there are significant enough deviations to generate political costs. Frequently, states augment gas tax revenues with revenues from other sources to fund roads, and it is not uncommon for some gas tax revenues to be diverted away from roads to finance other expenditures.
The tax structure can be formally embedded in constitutional rules, but even when it is not, the tax structure can still be a part of the effective fiscal constitution, in the sense of generally agreed-upon tax rules. When there is general agreement on the rules, political costs are not incurred to try to modify the tax structure. When the tax structure is flexible, economic agents are encouraged to incur political costs to try to modify the tax system for their benefit.
State income taxes can be used to illustrate the fuzzy line between formal constitutional provisions and the agreed-upon, nonformalized fiscal constitution. From 1961 to 1971, when the public sector was held in higher regard by voters than it is today, nine states established personal income taxes. A tenth, New Jersey, added a personal income tax in 1976. After that, no states added income taxes until Connecticut did so in 1991. It was a controversial move that, one could argue, violated the state's implied fiscal constitution. In 1993, Texas, which did not have a personal income tax, nor a provision in its constitution to prevent income taxation, passed an explicit constitutional amendment prohibiting one. In effect, Texas had a fiscal constitution that prohibited personal income taxation, but after the Connecticut experience, Texans decided to make explicit what they had always believed was a part of their implied fiscal constitution.
OPTIMAL EXCISE TAXATION
These concepts can be applied to the design of an optimal system of excise taxes. Ignoring political costs, the Ramsey (1927) rule would suggest taxing goods in inverse proportion to their elasticities of demand. A public choice approach to the problem would suggest taxing all goods at a single uniform rate to minimize political costs. A straightforward application of the Ramsey rule ignores the fact that, in reality, differential rates of excise taxation will be a product of the political system. Because of the way tax rates are set in reality, the political pressures imposed by interest groups will have much more to do with the actual structure of excise taxes than differences in demand elasticities among taxed goods. If the fiscal constitution allows different excise tax rates on different goods because in theory this could be optimal, political costs will be encouraged, and the end result of public policy is not likely to correspond with the Ramsey rule.
The Ramsey rule tells economists how the excess burden of taxes can be minimized when excise tax rates are set according to that rule. However, because tax rates are set according to the political power of interest groups, the political process will not produce a tax structure that follows the Ramsey rule in any event, and allowing differential rates of excise taxation merely opens the door for escalating political costs associated with excise taxation, increasing the welfare cost of taxation. When political costs are factored into the analysis, optimal excise taxation may National Tax Journal Vol 51 no. 2 (June1998) pp. 359-71 well imply uniform tax rates across goods, not different rates for different goods as the Ramsey rule implies. For example, North Carolina places an excise tax of 5 cents per pack on cigarettes, and Oklahoma, which has about the same level of per capita income and per capita government expenditures, has an excise tax of 23 cents per pack. Obviously, political power has more to do with the determination of those particular taxes than the Ramsey rule.
If some goods are exempt from taxation, or are taxed at different rates, this should be a part of the fiscal constitution, and not something subject to political manipulation, bringing with it the associated political costs. For example, about half the states that have general sales taxes exempt food from taxation, and some states exempt clothing. If these aspects of the tax system are considered a part of the fiscal constitution, then there will be minimal political costs associated with them. If, however, it appears that changes in these provisions might be politically feasible, interests on both sides of the issue will incur political costs to try to change the tax structure or, on the other side of the issue, to try to maintain the status quo.
OPTIMAL INCOME TAXATION
An extensive literature on optimal taxation, summarized by Mirrlees (1976) , follows the methodology of determining the optimal tax structure by maximizing a social welfare function subject to constraints, where social welfare is a function of the utilities of all individuals in the society. Buchanan (1976) criticizes this literature using an argument related to the earlier discussion on the benefit principle, because it fails to take account of the expenditure side of the budget. Of course, any use of a social welfare function is open to the criticism that it is not possible to make the interpersonal utility comparisons that this methodology requires. But the public choice perspective raises yet another problem. Because the tax system necessarily plays a redistributive role within this framework, the optimal tax system, derived this way, is likely to imply substantial political costs as all groups try to get as much revenue transferred to them, or as little transferred away from them, as possible.
Any system of progressive income taxation inherently has this problem, because, as Hayek (1960, p. 313) notes, "Unlike proportionality, progression provides no principle which tells us what the relative burden of different persons ought to be." On this ground, Buchanan (1993) argues for proportional taxation.
6 If proportional income taxation is accepted as a part of the fiscal constitution, the political costs of an income tax system can be lowered substantially. The same argument applies to deductions, exemptions, and tax credits as methods of altering the amount of income subject to taxation. If the tax system is flexible and subject to negotiation, it invites the creation of political costs to try to alter it.
Is it possible to create this type of fiscal constitution? At the federal level, Ballentine (1992) argues that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 made the tax system more stable, and more difficult to change, which should reduce political costs.
7 At the state level, this suggests making the taxpayer's state income tax liability a percentage of the taxpayer's federal tax liability. If such a provision is accepted as a part of the state's fiscal constitution, only the rate is subject to negotiation, greatly limiting the political costs of the tax system (and the compliance costs as well).
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Interestingly enough, the conclusions of the optimal tax literature following Mirrlees (1971) have pointed toward the desirability of a relatively flat rate income tax structure, even though methodologically that literature is quite at odds with the public choice approach to taxation. Taking political costs into account makes proportional income taxation look much more like an optimum without compromise. In this case, a public choice approach helps illuminate the issue of optimal income taxation, reinforcing and clarifying some of the conclusions in the literature. In other cases, such as optimal commodity taxation discussed in the previous section, a public choice approach yields conclusions more at odds with the conventional wisdom.
SOME TAXES GENERATE HIGHER POLITICAL COSTS THAN OTHERS
Taxes are the creation of the political system, and tax structures that are easily amended are likely to generate high political costs. Thus, tax systems should be a part of a stable fiscal constitution, with generally agreed-upon rules, in order to minimize political costs. One would conjecture that uniform and broad-based retail sales taxes would entail lower political costs than income taxes, for example, but despite the substantial political costs that are involved in tax reform, the issue has remained outside the national debate on whether a national sales tax or VAT would be desirable to supplement or replace the federal income tax, or whether a flat rate income tax with a redefined tax base, such as the one suggested by Hall and Rabushka (1985) , would be better than the current income tax structure. Of course, states constantly tinker with their sales tax rates-and especially their sales tax bases-creating political costs there too.
Thus, the conjecture that income taxes create greater political costs than sales taxes is just that: a conjecture. It may be that a state income tax tied directly to the taxpayer's federal income tax liability incurs smaller political costs than a general sales tax, where the base is subject to redefinition at every legislative session. Economists have done little empirical work on the political costs of taxation, even though such costs are obviously substantial and are a significant component of the total welfare cost of a tax system.
TAXATION AND REDISTRIBUTION
The tax system has long been viewed as a mechanism for redistributing income. However, as Stigler (1970) has noted, in the real world, income tends to be redistributed from those who have income and wealth to those who have political power, implying that there can be substantial overlap between taxpayers and recipients of redistribution. Thus, public choice theory suggests that the pattern of redistribution produced by the political system is unlikely to conform to the normative prescriptions of more traditional public finance models. Furthermore, it is likely that, if the fiscal constitution places no constraints on the nature of redistribution, democratic decision making by itself will not lead to a stable pattern of redistribution.
If redistribution is envisioned as a zerosum game, as in Atkinson (1995) , it is unstable, because there is always a majority coalition that can target the benefits of those who receive aboveaverage redistributional benefits and try to divide them among the coalition members. The majority coalition may temporarily be successful, giving them a larger than average share of the pie, but this makes them a tempting target for a National Tax Journal Vol 51 no. 2 (June1998) pp. 359-71 realigned majority coalition, creating a cyclical majority. Because redistribution is at best a zero-sum game, there is no stable pattern of redistribution that can be maintained under majority rule.
Public choice theory has offered two explanations for how a stable redistributive outcome might be produced by democratic institutions. Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) suggest that political institutions might generate a universal coalition in which everyone agrees to a roughly equal division. As Holcombe (1986) notes, this might result in an outcome that everyone agrees to under majority rule, but that produces an inefficient outcome, leaving everyone worse off than if the redistribution had not occurred. 8 More generally, redistributive outcomes might be stable because institutions prevent them from changing, but if so, this may make them a part of the fiscal constitution, limiting the political costs they generate. Taking a different approach, Becker (1983) and Wittman (1989) argue that those in government have an incentive to redistribute in the most efficient manner possible in order to minimize the deadweight loss of redistribution and maximize the political support of officeholders. Redistribution is not a zero-sum game, but a negativesum game, and the process is biased toward redistributive outcomes that minimize the total cost of redistribution. In other words, the process is biased toward pushing the negative sum as close to zero as possible.
Hettich and Winer (1988) follow
Becker's approach, applied specifically to taxation, to develop a model of the tax structure incorporating both democratic political institutions and the more traditional public finance notion of excess burden. Following this approach, the tax system that maximizes voter support, which would be optimal in Wittman's (1989) framework, is significantly different in principle from optimal taxation as defined by Mirrlees (1976) . Economists have long considered the possibility of using the tax system as a tool for redistributing income to enhance the social welfare. Taking a public choice perspective, one must recognize that redistribution is a product of a democratic decision-making process in which the beneficiaries of redistribution are more likely to be those who have political power than those who are really needy.
The tax system can also cause rent seeking to occur even when it is not explicitly used as an income redistribution tool, if the distribution of taxes is different from the distribution of benefits from government expenditures. Meltzer and Richard (1981) show why, when the decisive voter's tax share is below average, democratic decision making will create pressure for increased taxation to finance redistribution. 9 Thus, as Buchanan (1976) notes, there is an argument for applying the benefit principle of taxation to minimize the political costs of the tax system. Application of the benefit principle may also lower the more traditional measure of excess burden, if the tax acts as a price. Buchanan (1963) makes an argument for earmarked taxes, noting that, when taxes are not earmarked, the political process may lead to a suboptimal level and mix of government expenditures. Earmarking works well when those who pay the earmarked tax are also the recipients of the benefits financed by the tax. Otherwise, as Buchanan (1967) notes, there is the incentive for potential beneficiaries to try to finance their benefits with an earmarked tax levied on another group. Again, there is a National Tax Journal Vol 51 no. 2 (June1998) pp. 359-71 public choice argument for the benefit principle to minimize the political costs of the tax system. If tax shares do not correspond to the benefit principle, there is always the incentive for some people to engage in rent seeking for benefits that will be financed by taxes levied on others.
The tax system does not provide a good mechanism for redistribution, for two reasons. First, the explicit use of taxation as a redistributive mechanism invites the escalation of political costs. Second, the democratic decision-making process is not well-suited to enhancing social welfare through redistribution anyway, because it favors those with political power rather than those who are in need. The largest redistribution programs in the United States-Social Security and Medicare-illustrate both of these reasons. Many recipients are well-off compared to those who are paying for their benefits, and the elderly have incurred substantial political costs to make sure they retain the right to their transfers.
THE OPTIMAL SIZE AND MIX OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
Although the study of taxation is often undertaken without considering how those revenues will be spent, public choice theory has the potential to offer insight into how a tax system can be designed to encourage the optimal level and mix of government expenditures. As Samuelson (1954) noted, one problem with public expenditures is the difficulty of determining the efficient level of production. Indeed, this was the very problem that Wicksell and Lindahl were trying to solve. Building on Wicksell's approach, Buchanan (1976 Buchanan ( , 1993 has frequently argued that an optimal tax system cannot be designed without taking into account how its revenues will be spent. One role of a fiscal constitution is to match the costs and benefits of public sector expenditures. Holcombe (1978) argues that determining the level of government expenditures through a democratic decisionmaking process without the constraint of a fiscal constitution leads to a bias in favor of larger government expenditures. The reason is that political competition for the support of the decisive voter implies that candidates and parties will push to lower the taxes paid by the decisive voter, in order to win that voter's support. A simple application of the law of demand implies that, when the decisive voter's tax price is lowered, the quantity of government demanded by the decisive voter will rise, resulting in larger-thanoptimal government expenditures. Democracy contains an inherent bias toward inefficiently large government.
Wicksell and Lindahl attempted to counter this bias in two ways, but ways that are really two sides of the same coin. Wicksell is remembered for his idea that a substantial consensus should be reached on matters of public expenditure. Seeing the problems with simple majority rule, he advocated an approximate unanimity rule. Lindahl is remembered for Lindahl pricing, in which everyone's marginal tax price equals the value they place at the margin on the public good. These ideas are two sides of the same coin because taxpayers will agree on the level of public expenditures only when they face Lindahl tax prices.
While it may not be practical to design a tax system that produces Lindahl pricing exactly, it is possible to keep the principles of Wicksell and Lindahl in National Tax Journal Vol 51 no. 2 (June1998) pp. 359-71 mind so that there is some correspondence between tax prices and the benefits of public expenditures. A number of states have moved in this direction by requiring supermajority approval for taxes and expenditures in their legislatures, or in some cases direct voter approval, implementing the Wicksellian principle of consensus. User charges are an obvious mechanism for moving toward Lindahl pricing, and earmarked taxes levied on items associated with the resulting expenditure, such as the gas tax to finance roads and the federal excise tax on airline tickets to finance air traffic control and airport improvement, are but two examples. When Lindahl pricing can be approximated, it creates a consensus regarding the level of public expenditures, and is a mechanism for leading the political process toward the optimal level and mix of public expenditures. The benefit principle is much more than just a principle of tax equity.
FEDERALISM
One method of applying the benefit principle is to adopt a system of fiscal federalism and undertake all public sector expenditures at the lowest possible level of government. Following Tiebout's (1956) model, this can result in an efficient sorting of individuals with different preferences for government expenditures and can provide a revealed preference mechanism for public expenditures. It also means that there will be less opportunity for interests in one geographic area to receive locationspecific government benefits paid for by taxpayers in other areas. As Buchanan (1967) notes, the budgetary process works better when the government output benefits the population in general, rather than a subgroup of the population, and federalism helps achieve this goal. Without accounting for political costs, a public finance analysis might argue for taxation at a higher level of government to internalize fiscal externalities and to prevent taxpayers in one taxing district from free riding on the government production of other districts. This free riding will lead to inefficiency only if the public choice mechanism in local districts does not account for the benefits produced for those outside their districts. It is possible for districts to negotiate among themselves to internalize externalities, so intergovernmental spillovers do not necessarily imply a role for a higher level government on efficiency grounds.
10
When politics enters the picture, one must balance the potential inefficiencies of intergovernmental spillovers against the potential for inefficiently redistributive programs if a higher level government is employed, as Holcombe (1994) notes. McKenzie and Staaf (1978) have argued that tax collection at higher levels of government to finance expenditures at lower levels of government acts to cartelize lower levels of government, reducing the benefits of intergovernmental competition. This line of reasoning might be applied to tax harmonization in the European Union, for example. One can think of good reasons for having a high degree of uniformity in tax structures across districts, but uniformity imposed from above reduces intergovernmental competition and may produce a uniformly undesirable tax structure. Thus, the benefits of enforced uniformity must be weighed against the benefits of intergovernmental competition, keeping in mind that the process of intergovernmental competition itself might lead to more uniformity in tax systems. From a public choice standpoint, a federal system with much local autonomy has much to recommend it.
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Public choice analysis also suggests some problems with federalism. Sobel (1997) shows that, when two levels of government tax the same base, there is a tendency for the combined tax rates to be inefficiently large. This happens because when one government chooses its level of taxation, it takes the other government's tax rate as given. Thus, a rate increase by one government reduces the tax base of the other, but governments have no incentive to take these fiscal externalities into account. This obviously applies to federal and state taxation of income and lends a different perspective to the debate on a possible national sales tax. More generally, the political dynamics among different levels of governments need to be taken into account in an analysis of taxation in federal systems.
THE MOTIVATIONS OF PEOPLE IN GOVERNMENT
In the same way that neoclassical microeconomics has characterized firms as profit maximizers, Niskanen (1971) has characterized government bureaucracies as budget maximizers. Niskanen's idea has crept into the analysis of fiscal systems to a limited degree, but most models of taxation, even when undertaken from a public choice perspective, paint the public sector as a type of market in which the competing demands of various interests are balanced against each other to determine public policy. McKenzie and Staaf (1978) , as just noted, build upon Niskanen's ideas to describe the efforts of local governments to cartelize and reduce intergovernmental competition. More ominously, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) examine the concept of optimal taxation under the assumption that the government's motivation is revenue maximization to show the welfareenhancing properties of a fiscal constitution to constrain the power of government. Holcombe (1994) argues that it is in the government's interest, even if it wants to maximize revenues, to impose constitutional constraints on its own actions. Usher (1992) combines public choice analysis with a public finance foundation to show both the role of government and the benefits of constraints on government.
All of these studies are suggestive, but at the same time, public choice analysis has done little to examine the effects of the motivations of legislators who pass tax law, and of the bureaucrats who interpret and enforce tax law, on the tax system. The public choice foundation is there, but the application to taxation is not, suggesting an avenue for further research.
Conclusions
No analysis of tax policy is complete unless it includes an explicit recognition of the public choice environment within which tax policy is made. The related areas of public expenditures and redistribution policy have already been analyzed much more extensively from a public choice perspective, and tax policy would benefit from the same attention to public choice issues. Not only is there a substantial opportunity for academic research applying public choice ideas to taxation, any analysis of tax policy that does not consider the political environment must be viewed as incomplete.
While this essay has suggested one possible direction for incorporating public choice analysis into the study of taxation, the companion paper in this issue by Winer and Hettich takes a different tack by depicting the tax structure as a political equilibrium, where the legislature weighs the demands of interests on all sides of an National Tax Journal Vol 51 no. 2 (June1998) pp. 359-71 issue and acts as a political marketplace. In the Chicago tradition, Becker (1983) and Wittman (1989) suggest that this type of political process results in an efficient outcome, and Winer and Hettich echo this idea by arguing that, once the political process is taken into account, provisions of the tax code, including special interest provisions, can be seen as efficient responses to political interests. In contrast, the present paper advocates a broad-based and uniform tax system that constitutionally prevents special interest tax benefits.
This difference between the papers is an example of the difference between what Lott (1997) and others have called the Chicago and Virginia approaches to public choice. Within the context of the Coase theorem, the Chicago approach depicts transactions costs as low enough that political markets respond to political demands relatively efficiently. The outcome of political exchange, including special interest tax provisions, tends to be efficient. The Virginia approach views transactions costs as more significant, preventing political markets from allocating resources efficiently. Parties to the political bargain may be better off, but high transactions costs prevent most people from participating in the political exchange process, and the costs imposed on those outside the bargaining group exceed the benefits generated for special interests. There may not even be any net benefits to the interest groups themselves, as the rent-seeking literature begun by Tullock (1967) and Kreuger (1974) has demonstrated, and when one recognizes that political costs are incurred by those who only want to preserve the status quo, this conclusion is reinforced.
In the Chicago approach, negotiating for special interest provisions in the tax code is efficiency enhancing, while the Virginia approach argues against special interest provisions and, more significantly, argues against allowing them to be negotiated through the political process. For efficiency, any special interest provisions in the tax code should be part of the fiscal constitution. This contrast between approaches shows that public choice is more a method of analysis than a set of conclusions, and that, even when public choice factors are taken into account, there are a number of open questions with regard to tax policy. Despite some points of disagreement, both papers are largely consistent with each other and show the additional insights that can be gained by incorporating public choice into the study of taxation.
While these essays suggest a number of ways that public choice analysis could be applied to the study of taxation, relatively little has been done in this area. Empirical studies of political costs would shed light on their magnitude and might indicate institutional changes that could be made to limit political costs. This avenue of inquiry would make a contribution to the understanding of tax policy and also to the understanding of rent seeking more generally. Models of the policymaking process that better capture the motivations of policymakers might lend more insight into the way the tax structure actually evolves, as Winer and Hettich indicate, and also might suggest desirable features for the fiscal constitution. The tax system is a creation of a political decision-making process, and the idea that it is worthwhile to take a public choice approach to the study of tax policy says nothing more than that we would understand more about taxation if we understood more about the process by which taxes are designed.
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ENDNOTES
The author gratefully acknowledges helpful comments on an earlier draft from James Buchanan, Thomas McCaleb, Joel Slemrod, and Stanley Winer. 1 Public finance textbooks have been taking more account of public choice, but usually public choice analysis is confined to one chapter. Rosen (1995) , the market leader, devotes one chapter specifically to public choice, but does not discuss public choice considerations much outside of that chapter. Holcombe (1996) , my public finance textbook, has more chapters devoted to public choice and also tries to integrate public choice ideas throughout the book, but I will leave it to readers to decide if I am any more successful than other textbook authors. 2 This theme has run through much of Buchanan's work on taxation. Brennan and Buchanan (1985) present a more general argument in favor of constitutional rules. 3 Administrative costs are mainly a budgetary item, so they are relatively easy to estimate. Compliance costs are spread among all taxpayers and take the form of time, storage costs for records, and monetary payments for tax collections. Slemrod and Sorum (1984) estimated that taxpayer compliance costs for the U.S. individual income tax were about five to seven percent of the revenues collected. Recent estimates by the IRS indicate that compliance costs for all federal taxes are 8.7 percent of total tax collections, exceeding the Slemrod and Sorum estimates, and that administrative costs are about 0.5 percent of collections. 4 For example, when the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was being written, realtors lobbied hard to retain the home mortgage interest deduction. The result was to retain the status quo, and substantial political costs were incurred without raising any revenue. 5 Of course, people may favor using the public sector to transfer income from them to others, as Hochman and Rogers (1969) noted. 6 For a public choice argument going in the other direction, see Buchanan (1967) , who argues, "under certain conditions progressive income taxation may be rationally preferred by the individual, and, at least to some extent, these conditions embody features of real-world institutional choice" (p. 237). 7 Note, however, that Buchanan (1987) correctly predicted that, after the reform, both tax rates and government expenditures would rise. 8 This can occur because, under majority rule, voters realize they are unlikely to cast the decisive vote, so their vote will not determine the election outcome. However, their vote always determines whether they are in the majority or minority coalition. If there are advantages to voting with the majority, this can produce a situation where everybody votes for an outcome that makes everyone worseoff. A voter who defects from the majority coalition loses the advantages of being in the majority, but the election outcome remains the same. 9 Meltzer and Richard (1981) argue that more income inequality increases the amount of redistribution, whereas Peltzman (1980) argues the opposite. 10 Foldvary (1994) discusses ways in which communities can work together without the intervention of higher level governments to internalize intergovernmental spillovers.
